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Growth in Pakistan 
 
NASIR M. KHILJI and AKHTAR MAHMOOD 
 
This paper explores the impacts of defence expenditures on economic growth and 
other major economic variables in the Pakistan economy over the period 1972-1995.  The 
results of Granger-causality tests show that there is bi-directional feedback between the 
defence burden and GDP growth.  We test four different single equation models that are 
widely used in the defence literature. In these frameworks we generally find the defence 
burden to be negatively related to GDP growth. Finally, we specify a three-equation 
model which explains GDP growth, average propensity to save, and the defence ratio.  In 
single equation estimations of the savings ratio and the defence burden, we uncover some 
interesting relationships.  The savings ratio is affected positively by the defence ratio, and 
negatively by the inflation rate. The Pakistani defence burden is impacted negatively by 
the Indian defence burden and positively by the government budget. When all three 
equations are estimated as a system to account for feedback and covariance between 
these equations, these effects are diminished and go down in statistical significance. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the first things taught to students of economics is that no economy has 
unlimited primary resources. There are a maximum of types of goods and services 
that can be produced with these resources at a point in time.  In order to produce 
more of a particular type of good or service, in a fully employed economy, other 
goods have to be sacrificed.  The production possibilities frontier is normally used to 
illustrate this concept and one of the classic examples provided is the bread versus 
guns choice.  The point being that if a society chooses to allocate more resources to 
defence, it will have to make do with less consumer products.  Moreover, since 
defence takes away resources that partly could have been devoted to producing 
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investment goods, the economy’s growth potential is retarded as a consequence of 
increased defence allocation. While this argument holds at a point in time, it may not  
be the case over time.  It may be the case that resources devoted to defence at  one 
point in time have positive effects on other sectors of the economy both in the 
present and in the future so that the ability of the economy to produce more of all 
goods in the future is enhanced.   
For the developed countries, it has been shown that increased defence 
spending is inversely related to rates of economic growth, investment, and 
employment. [Smith (1977); Boretsky (1975) and Sivard (1977).] For the developing 
countries the evidence is less clear cut. What is the effect of military expenditures on 
the development process? There have been numerous attempts to answer this 
question since the seminal work of the late Emile Benoit (1973) that found a positive 
correlation between defence spending and GDP growth in a cross-section of 44 
countries.1 Before we review some of the subsequent work, it would be useful to lay 
out the ways (not necessarily mutually exclusive) that defence spending is purported 
to affect development and economic growth. 
The first way is the Keynesian notion of the creation of  additional aggregate 
demand.  As, Benoit (1973); Faini et al. (1984) and others have suggested, if 
aggregate demand is initially inadequate relative to potential supply, the increase in 
aggregate demand of higher defence spending, through multiplier effects, may lead 
to increased utilisation of the capital stock and greater employment of labour. An 
efficient capacity utilisation may lead to an increase in the profit rate, which will 
stimulate investment and ultimately increase the growth rate.  While this argument 
may hold for economies characterised by deficient aggregate demand, it is doubtful 
that it applies to developing economies characterised by supply constraints. 
The second major way that defence can affect growth is the standard textbook 
idea of opportunity costs alluded to above. Military expenditures divert resources 
away from other uses and may have a direct opportunity cost in terms of foregone 
investment. By reducing potential savings available for planned investment, it 
enlarges the savings-investment gap. If a substantial part of armaments is imported, 
as in Pakistan, then this also imposes a balance-of-payment problem on the 
economy.  Critics of this view argue that resources are not diverted from investment 
but rather socially wasteful expenditures [Benoit (1973)]. Regarding the balance-of-
payment problem it is countered that military and economic security are 
complements, and that if donors consider military and economic aid to be correlated, 
one may lead to the other, such as Pakistan in the early 1960s and during the 
Afghanistan war.  Therefore foreign aid may pay for part of defence, especially 
imported armaments.  
The third way is the idea that there are several spin-offs that are a 
consequence of military expenditures and can be beneficial to growth, though not 
1Ball (1983) has an extensive critique of this work. 
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always so.  On the one hand, the military may engage in R & D, provide technical 
skills, organise rural labour (as soldiers) to accept discipline, give educational 
training and medical care, introduce new technology, and/or create infrastructure.  
On the other hand, the appropriateness and adequacy of such technology, 
infrastructure, ethos, and discipline are subject to question, since it is possible, that 
security-related objectives may not be beneficial to civilian needs.   
Finally, military expenditures may influence growth through the creation and 
mobilisation of new resources.  One way in which this can happen is through inflation. 
In aggregate-supply-constrained economies defence spending is inflationary. Inflation 
may lead to “forced saving,” an increased supply of new resources lured by high 
prices, or a rise in profitability that induces higher investment.  However, it is also 
possible that expectations of continuing inflation might cause an increase in 
consumption expenditures, and investment in sectors that have little growth potential. 
There exists a substantial body of research, composed of empirical studies, 
attempting to quantify these various influences of military expenditures on developing 
countries’ growth rates.  Three strands of this literature can be discerned. Following 
Benoit, the first line of research has been concerned primarily with analysing the 
relationship between defence and economic growth.  Most of this work relies on cross-
section data for as large a number of countries as are possible.  Averages of the 
relevant variables over a decade or two for each country are computed.  Some studies 
have supported Benoit’s findings while others have found a statistically significant 
negative impact of defence spending on economic growth. After an extensive review of 
these studies, Chan (1985) concludes, on page 433, that ‘…there is no consensus about 
the actual existence and nature of such an impact.’  He goes on to say that ‘….we have 
probably reached a point of diminishing returns in relying on aggregate cross-national 
studies to inform us about the economic of defence spending…. Future research will 
profit more from discriminating diachronic studies of individual countries’. 
The second line investigates causality between defence spending and 
economic growth.  While not much work was done in this area in the seventies, it is 
being rapidly populated by empirical studies as longer time series on individual 
countries become available.  The third, and more recent, line of research introduces 
political instability into the analysis and focuses on its relationship to defence or to 
economic growth.  For example, Hess and Orphanides (1991) develop a model to 
analyse the relationship between defence and political instability.  They provide the 
conditions necessary for an elected official to start an unnecessary war to increase his 
or her probability of re-election.  Others, such as Alesina et al. (1991) and Londregan 
and Poole (1990), have investigated the empirical relationship between political 
instability and growth. Grossman (1991) links political events to economic 
activities.2 
2See Blomberg (1996) for more on this literature.
Khilji and Mahmood 794
This paper is related mainly to the first two areas of research.  The third area 
where political stability is linked to defence and growth requires the computation of 
an index of political stability/instability and other hard to quantify variables.  
Computing indices for political variables would be a major research effort by itself.  
This paper attempts to fill a gap in the empirical literature on the economics of 
defence and growth by focussing on a single country.  As noted previously such case 
studies are rare. 
As far as we know, not much work has been done on examining the 
relationship between defence spending, economic growth, and other major economic 
variables for Pakistan. Baffes and Shah (1993) employ a flexible production 
structure methodology, where public and private inputs interact and contribute to 
national output.  Public capital is disaggregated into infrastructure, human resource 
development and military capital stocks.  Based on an analysis of time-series (1965–
84) and cross-section (25 countries including Pakistan), the paper concludes that the 
contribution of military spending to economic growth appears to be negative for a 
substantial number of countries.  Pakistan is among them and its output elasticity 
with respect to military capital is found to be –0.02. Bayoumi et al. (1993) 
investigate the economic impact of a co-ordinated reduction in military expenditures 
of 20 percent using a specially modified version of the MULTIMOD world 
economic model.  Simulation results for Pakistan indicate that the size in the cuts in 
military spending allow for a relatively large increase in private consumption and 
investment in both the short- and long-run.  Economic welfare increases by 113 
percent of 1992 GDP, compared with military spending cuts equivalent to 93 percent 
of 1992 GDP.   
Both the studies mentioned for Pakistan use pooled data sets covering a large 
number of countries and allow for some fixed effects for Pakistan while assuming 
that other parameters are constant across countries. Given the heterogeneity of the 
countries’ experiences and economic structures, it is doubtful whether complete 
impacts on all the major economic variables are uncovered for individual countries.  
This paper examines the effects of military spending on economic growth and other 
major economic variables for Pakistan.  The country provides an interesting example 
of a low-income country, which has devoted substantial resources to defence over 
the past 50 years. Generally this has ranged between 6 to 7 percent of GDP putting 
Pakistan in the top 20 countries ranked in terms of military expenditures as a 
proportion of GDP by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
in 1997.3 
We test empirically several models that are prevalent in the literature. The 
data set we use has been constructed for the specific purpose and covers the period 
3Israel tops the list with 28 percent.  Some countries that spend roughly similar percentages are 
Taiwan (7.1 percent), Chad (6.1 percent), Malaysia (6.7 percent), Iran (6.1 percent), and Myanmar (6.1 
percent).  India comes in at number 63 with 3.1 percent of its GDP devoted to military expenditures. 
Military Expenditures and Economic Growth 795
1972 to 1995. Information on most of the variables employed in the study was taken 
from the International Financial Statistics (IMF) and World Tables (World Bank).  
We had a choice to make about defence expenditures since there are three sources.  
These sources are the Government of Pakistan, the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ASACDA), and SIPRI. Nearly all researchers use defence 
estimates provided by SIPRI or ASACDA since these are considered to be more 
reliable as the agencies supposedly have no axe to grind.4 We use the estimates of 
Pakistan defence expenditures provided by ASACDA in the paper.   
The next three sections are devoted to model formulations and their respective 
statistical estimations.  Most studies assume that defence is determined exogenously 
and estimate its effects on other economic variables, primarily growth in GDP.  
Section 2 formally conducts a test for causality in the Granger sense between the 
defence burden and GDP growth to check whether this is true.  Section 3 moves on 
to posit and estimate several single equation models, that have been influential in the 
literature, to assess the impact of defence expenditures on GDP growth and other 
important economic variables. Section 4 formulates and estimates a 3-equation 
model explaining GDP growth, savings rate, and the defence burden.  A brief 
summary and conclusion section ends this paper. 
 
II.  CAUSALITY: GROWTH TO DEFENCE  
OR VICE VERSA OR BOTH 
As mentioned above many of the empirical studies on defence and growth 
have failed to tackle the issue of causality and have gone along with Benoit’s (1978) 
original assumption that causality goes from defence burden to growth.  Studies by 
Joerding (1986) and LaCivita and Fredericksen (1991) have challenged this 
assumption by employing Granger causality methods. Joerding used a pooled sample 
containing 15 observations from each of 57 countries.  His tests showed that defence 
expenditures are not exogenous. LaCivita and Fredericksen used 20 to 28 
observations for each of 21 countries and their tests showed that there was a bi-
directional causality between defence and growth.  
In this section we report our findings on Pakistan based on Granger causality 
tests. The methodology is straightforward and now is standard in most econometric 
textbooks.  We use Hsiao’s method that combines Granger causality and Akaike’s 
Final Prediction Error (FPE). This procedure allows for the determination of the 
optimal lag for each variable and the causal relationship.  The first step in Hsiao’s 
procedure is to perform a series of autoregressive regressions on the dependent 
variable.  In the first regression, the dependent variable (GDP growth) is lagged 
once.  In each succeeding regression, one more lag on the dependent variable is 
added.  That is, we estimate n models of the form 
4See Happe and Wakeman-Lin  (1994) for a discussion and evaluation of these and other sources 
of data on military expenditures. 
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Gt = α + Σ βt–i Gt–i  + εt; where, i =1,…,n … … … (1) 
The choice of maximum lag lengths, n, is arbitrary but they should be 
sufficiently large and consistent with the sample size.  Our sample runs from 1972 to 
1995.  We set the maximum lag length to 4.5  For each regression FPE was computed 
as follows: 
FPE(n) = [(T + n + 1)/T – n – 1)]ESS(n)/T … … … (2) 
Where T is the sample size, and FPE(n) and ESS(n) are the final prediction error and 
the sum of squared residuals, respectively.  The optimal lag length n* is the one that 
gives the lowest FPE. This came out to be one. Once n* was determined, models 
were estimated with the lags on the other variable added sequentially in the same 
manner used to determine n*. We estimated m (4) models of the form: 
Gt = α + Σn* βt–iGt–i  + Σm γt–i Dt–i + εt … … … (3) 
Again FPE was computed for each regression equation as: 
FPE(n*,m) = [(T + n* + m +1)/(T – n* – m  – 1)]ESS(n*, m)/T … (4) 
The optimal lag length for D, m*, is the lag length which has the minimum 
FPE. This test is equivalent to using a series of F tests with variable levels of 
significance. Again this turned out to be one lag. To test for causality, the FPE with 
D omitted from the model, FPE(n*) was compared to the FPE with D included in 
the model, (FPEn*,m*). They were as follows: 
FPEn* = 2.94 
FPEn*,m* = 2.80 
As the FPE with defence present is less than without defence we conclude 
that defence spending Granger-causes economic growth. The steps outlined above 
were repeated with defence as the dependent variable.  The optimal lag lengths were 
1 and 2 respectively.  The FPEs were: 
FPE(1) = 0.24 
FPE(1,2) = 0.20  
Since the FPE with GDP growth present in the model is less than FPE 
without GDP growth included we conclude that GDP growth Granger-causes 
defence. Therefore there was bi-directional causality between the defence burden and 
GDP growth during the 1972–95 period. 
5This is more of a problem in studies employing quarterly, monthly, or higher frequency data.  
Our study uses annual data, and therefore 4 years is a fairly long time for a variable to have had an impact. 
Military Expenditures and Economic Growth 797
III.  SINGLE EQUATION MODELS FOR ANALYSING THE 
EFFECTS OF MILITARY SPENDING ON GROWTH 
As the previous section has shown, there appears to be bi-directional causality 
running between the defence burden and GDP growth.  Therefore single equation 
models that assume defence to be exogenous may give biased results.  Before we go 
on to a model that allows for both defence and GDP growth to be endogenous, in this 
section we estimate four single equation models that have been widely used.  Besides 
providing information about the nature of the impacts of defence expenditures on 
economic growth, this procedure will allow us to determine the appropriate form of 
the growth equation to be used in a simultaneous framework. 
 
Model 1 
The first model is a military twist on the basic Keynesian model introduced by 
Benoit (1978) and Faini et al. (1984).  We begin with the national accounts 
identities. 
Y = CP + GD + GND + I + X – M … … … … (5) 
 
S = Y – CP – GND … … … … … (6) 
Where Y is income,  CP is private consumption, GD is defence expenditures, GND is 
non defence consumption expenditures of the government, I is total private and 
public investment, X is exports, M is imports, and S is savings. The savings and 
import functions have the simple forms: 
S = sY … … … … … … (7)        
M = m1Y + m2(I + GD) … … … … … (8) 
We assume that there is a level of full capacity output, Y*, which can be related to 
the existing capital stock. We therefore define a relative utilisation rate, u, as 
U = (Y* – Y)/K, … … … … … … (9) 
where K is capital stock. We assume that investment responds to the level of  
capacity utilisation.  In Pakistan it is also restrained by absorptive capacity—the 
ability of the economy to muster skilled workers, management, key pieces of 
equipment, and other inputs necessary to carry through investment projects. The 
absorptive capacity limit is specified as: 
V = V[(I+GD)/K, Y/K, (E – M)/K, GD/Y, Pop], … … (10) 
where Pop represents total population. A larger value of V means that capital 
formation is more difficult.  Higher levels of investment demand, defence spending, 
or output (relative to capital stock) will put pressure on available supplies of capital, 
Khilji and Mahmood 798
skilled labour, and foreign exchange. More available foreign exchange (E – M) will 
have the opposite effect. The term GD/Y (defence ratio) allows for productive-raising 
effects of military spending.  A reduced form for the real growth rate of GDP, g, can 
be inferred from the equations above.6 
g =  a0 + a1x + a2n + a3∆(GD/Y) + a4∆F + a5k +ε … … (11) 
The explanatory variables are the growth rates of exports, capital stock, and 
population (x, k, and n respectively), the change in foreign capital inflows (∆F), and 
the change in defence spending share of GDP. 
The OLS parameter estimates (corrected for serial correlation) of this equation 
are as follows: 
g = 14.49 + 0.18x – 3.88n  – 2.0∆(GD/Y) + 0.24∆(F/Y) + 0.63k … (12) 
  (1.0)    (2.04)    (–0.86)   (–1.61)    (0.63)        (2.90) 
 
          Adj. R2 = 0.45, F = 4.13, D.W. = 2.20,  ρ = –0.43 
 
The number in parentheses below the parameter estimates are the t values.  
Also reported are the adjusted coefficient of multiple determination (R2), the F value, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic, and the autocorrelation coefficient.  The critical t and F 
values are 1.711 and 2.55 respectively.7  These jointly indicate that the equation is 
statistically significant and explains 45 percent of the variation in the growth of 
GDP.  Growth in the capital stock has the expected sign.  An increase in the defence 
burden has a negative impact on the growth rate.8  However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at a 10 percent level of significance for a two-tail test.  For a 
one-tail test at the 10 percent level of significance, it is statistically significant.  
Export growth influences economic growth positively. 
 
Model 2 
The second model widely used in the literature is based on an explicit Harrod 
Domar capital-centred growth equation.  In general form it is as follows: 
G = f(IOCR, I/Y) … … … … … … (13) 
Where IOCR is the incremental output capital ratio and the symbols have been 
defined before, i.e., g is the growth rate of output and I/Y is the ratio of total 
investment to GDP. The standard argument against defence expenditures is that, for 
a given surplus of production over consumption, it diverts funds from investment and 
6See Faini et al. (1984) and Stewart (1991) for details. 
7This is assuming a two-tail t test at the 90 percent confidence level. For the F test we assume a 
95 percent confidence level in this paper.  
8The term ‘defence burden’ is interesting and it is widely used in the literature to represent the 
share of military expenditures in GDP.  In a way, the term presupposes the issue. 
Military Expenditures and Economic Growth 799
thus hinders growth.  For a closed economy, a higher defence expenditure to GDP 
ratio (GD/Y) means a lower investment ratio (I/Y).  This can be represented as: 
I/Y = f(GD/Y), … … … … … … (14) 
where I/Y and GD/Y are expected to be negatively related. Foreign capital inflows 
may enable a country to increase its defence and investment expenditures at the same 
time. In order to isolate the effect of defence spending on economic growth, we 
incorporate foreign capital inflows in the trade-off model and rewrite Equation (14) 
as: 
I/Y = f(GD/Y, F/Y), … … … … … (15) 
where F/Y is the foreign capital inflow to GDP ratio.  For a given GD/Y, F/Y and I/Y 
are hypothesised to be positively related.9 The substitution of Equation (15) into 
Equation (13) gives the following estimating equation: 
g =  b0 + b1IOCR + b2(GD/Y) + b3(F/Y)  + b4(S/Y) + ε … … (16) 
 
We include the savings ratio (S/Y) in addition to foreign capital inflows as it brings 
out more directly the impact that different sources of funds have on investment and 
defence expenditures.  The estimated equation (corrected for serial correlation) is: 
g = 4.59 + 2.91 IOCR – 0.89(GD/Y) + 0.10(F/Y) + 0.20(S/Y) … (17) 
  (0.8)   (2.10)       (–1.97)     (0.72)       (2.04) 
 
Adj. R2 = 0.28, F = 2.74, D.W. = 2.17, ρ = –0.19, 
 
where ρ is the autocorrelation coefficient. The equation is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level.  Both IOCR and GD/Y are statistically significant and although 
the effect of (F/Y) is positive, it is not statistically significant. In a similar 
framework, Lim’s (1983) findings that defence is not related to growth for 11 Asian 
countries are not supported by our results. However, our results do support Lim’s 
finding that capital flows do not have much impact on growth.10 
 
Model 3 
Following up on the Harrod-Domar model, subsequent substantial growth 
theory contributions include Solow (1970); Hicks (1965) and Lucas (1988). The 
contributions made by these and several other economists have provided the 
theoretical foundations for the typical rendition of the empirical neo-classical growth 
9Foreign capital flows could be disaggregated into bilateral and multilateral flows.  Khilji and 
Zampelli (1991, 1994) have found that U.S. bilateral aid is generally treated as a fungible resource by 
Pakistan, Israel, Jordan, India, Egypt, Turkey, Thailand, and Philippines.  Most of it is channelled to 
defence and private consumption with negligible impacts on investment. 
10Lim does not provide the names of the 11 Asian countries in the paper. 
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model found in the growth and development literature today.11 In a recent paper 
Nelson and Singh (1994) modify the Harrod-Domar model to include defence and 
other important policy variables.  They estimate the resulting model based on a 
cross-section data set for 70 countries.  Their model (modified by us for Pakistan) is 
as follows: 
g = c0 + c1(D/Y) + c2(GD/Y) + c3(GR/Y) + c4(I/Y) + c5INF + c6n + ε, (18) 
where D is the government deficit, GR is government revenue, and INF is the 
inflation rate. Other symbols retain the same meaning as before. Government 
policies toward spending, taxation and regulation can have important effects on 
capital formation, labour force growth, and technological progress. The policy 
variables included are the fiscal deficit (D), and overall government size proxied by 
government revenues, military expenditures, and public investment.12 As the fiscal 
deficit variable is not adjusted for the effects that inflation might have on the real 
deficit, inflation rate is also included. 
The estimated equation (corrected for serial correlation) is as follows: 
g = 22.74 – 0.20(D/Y) – 0.68(GD/Y) – 0.10(GR/Y)  
  (1.77)   (–1.60)        (–1.82)    (–0.36)  
 + 0.46(I/Y) –  0.21INF + 0.08n 
   (1.85) (–2.14) (0.03) … … … (19) 
   
         Adj. R2 = 0.34, F = 2.76, D.W. = 2.18, ρ = –0.39 
 
We find that all government policy variables affect growth negatively 
although GR and D are not statistically significant. Nelson and Singh (1994) found 
that the budget deficit ratio and defence ratio were negative for low-income countries 
in their sample but not statistically significant. The government ratio was found to 
positively influence growth but again was not statistically significant. Inflation 
strongly retards growth both in Pakistan (our findings) and in low-income countries 
as found by Nelson and Singh.  Unlike Nelson and Singh’s findings of positive and 
statistically significant effects of population growth, our results do not find that the 
variable has an independent effect in this augmented model. 
 
Model 4 
The final single equation model that we will use is based on the widely cited 
1975 World Bank study by Chenery and Syrquin. They state their dependent 
11The work by Barro (1991) has also been influential in spawning the vast literature that uses 
cross-country regressions to search for empirical linkages between average growth rates and socio-
economic and public policy indicators. See Levine and Renelt (1992) for a critical review. 
12We were unable to obtain a separate series for public investment.  Therefore, total investment, 
instead of a disaggregation of it, is used here. 
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variables in the form of ratios to GDP, and with incorporation of the defence ratio 
their equation becomes: 
Z/Y = d0 + d1log(Y/Pop) + d2[log(Y/Pop)]2 + d3log(Pop) + 
d4[log(Pop)]2 + d5F + d6(GD/Y) + ε, … … … (20)  
where Z represents different important economic variables.  By doing this we can 
trace through other possible effects of defence spending on the Pakistan economy.  
The estimated parameters giving the effects of the defence ratio variable on 
important variables in Pakistan are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Coefficients of the Defence Burden Variable in Equation (20) for the Following 
Variables in Pakistan 
Variables Coefficients t-Ratios 
Investment/GDP –0.184 –0.78 
Imports/GDP 0.333 0.43 
Agriculture/GDP 0.718 1.02 
Industry/GDP 0.582 1.02 
Tertiary Sector/GDP 2.095 1.37  
Tax Receipts/GDP –0.514 –1.28 
GDP Growth Rate –0.640 –1.66 
Growth of Non-defence Output –1.105 –1.67 
                                                                                                                       
Other than the negative and statistically significant effects on GDP growth 
and growth of non-defence output, the defence burden has no statistically significant 
effects on the other important variables in the economy. In a similar study for India 
for the 1951–1972 period, Faini et al. (1984), found the defence burden to have 
positive and statistically significant effects on investment share, industry share, tax 
receipts ratio.  It affected negatively, and statistically significantly, agricultural 
output.  While there were negative effects on GDP growth and nondefence output 
growth, they were not statistically significant.13  
 
IV.  A THREE-EQUATION MODEL FOR PAKISTAN 
The single equation models for Pakistan reported in the previous section 
generally give statistically significant coefficients, have the right signs predicted by 
economic theory, and are based on the structural characteristics of Pakistan as they 
pertain to military spending and growth.  However, neither the results nor the 
estimation methods reflect the degree of interdependence that exists between these 
13Our study is strictly not comparable to theirs since they did it for a much earlier period for 
India.  Moreover, India’s defence ratio is about half of Pakistan’s.  
Khilji and Mahmood 802
variables. Therefore, conclusions derived from such models may be misleading.  In 
this section we specify a three-equation model and report the results of estimating the 
model as a system.  Equations are developed for the savings-income ratio, and the 
military burden. 
As the previous section has focussed on estimating several equations for GDP 
growth we have to make a choice of which one to include in the simultaneous model.  
Equation (16), in Model 2, is satisfactory for the purpose.  It is derived 
systematically within an explicit conceptual framework and has all the important 
variables whose effects we are interested in studying. The national savings ratio 
would clearly depend upon economic growth as suggested by economic theory. If it 
is taken to be an indicator of resources available to the economy, then the effect of 
inflation on resource creation would be important to understand.  Whether foreign 
capital inflows retard or encourage national savings is another issue that can be 
empirically investigated.  It is probably true that the most important channel through 
which defence can influence growth is the creation and mobilisation of extra savings 
for the economy.  Therefore the role of the defence burden in affecting the average 
propensity to save is important to ascertain.  Based on these considerations we posit 
the following general form for the savings ratio: 
S/Y = f(g, INF, GD/Y, F/Y), … … … … (21) 
where growth is expected to influence the savings ratio positively.  The signs on the 
other variables cannot be indicated a priori.  Several forms of the equation were 
experimented with. This including imposing various lag structures on the 
explanatory variables, excluding each variable to see how its absence affected the 
values and statistical significance of the remaining variables.14 The estimated 
equation that was most satisfactory, based on economic theory and statistical tests, is 
as follows: 
S/Y = –9.51  +  0.26g – 0.67INF + 0.13(F/Y) + 5.07(GD/Y) … … (22) 
 (–0.80) (1.61)  (–3.90)  (0.45)  (3.68) 
 
         Adj. R2 = 0.72, F = 14.92, D.W. = 1.93. 
 
The positive influence of the defence burden on the national savings rate is 
remarkable.  It may be because of increased savings resulting from the sale of 
defence bonds or a moral dedication toward greater savings, and austerity in times of 
national crises.  Pakistan has had many national crises. On the other hand inflation 
has a negative and statistically significant effect on the savings ratio. 
Extensive experimentation was done to find the determinants of military 
burden (GD/Y).  In all specifications GDP growth could not explain the defence 
14These results and the results of experimentation with alternative forms of the defence ratio 
equation are available from Nasir Khilji. 
Military Expenditures and Economic Growth 803
burden. What did turn out to be crucial in explaining defence was government 
consumption spending as a proportion of GDP. Foreign capital inflows were not 
statistically significant in all specifications.  Defence is also a major public good, and 
conventional public finance theory suggests that it be dependent on total population. The 
effect of security related and strategic considerations were investigated by including 
Indian defence expenditures (taken from USACDA) as a ratio of India’s GDP. An 
alternative variable used was the ratio of Indian defence expenditures and Pakistani 
defence expenditures. In all specifications, including different lag structures, both 
variables came in as negative and statistically significant.  While this result goes against 
the conventional view in Pakistan, it can be explained by the fact that Indian defence 
expenditures by themselves do not cause Pakistan security concerns to be heightened.  It 
is what those expenditures are devoted to that probably matters as much, if not more.   
In an interesting theoretical and empirical paper on the Indo-Pakistani arms 
competition, Oren (1994) reaches the same conclusion. Oren’s empirical findings are 
consistent with his findings for the superpowers’ case: India and Pakistan are found 
to have matched high levels of armaments with low levels and vice-versa. Our 
results and Oren’s findings contradict conventional wisdom on power balancing.  
Oren’s theory explains this anomalous phenomenon.  States use strength not just as 
an indicator of capability but also of intentions. Given the same amount of hostile 
behaviour, weak states appear more aggressive than strong ones.  
The most satisfactory estimated equation for the defence burden is as follows: 
(GD/Y) = 3.68 + 0.21(GC/Y) – 0.85(GDIN/YIN) + 0.89n … … (23) 
 (2.26) (3.63) (–1.73) (1.61) 
 
          Adj. R2 = 0.55, F = 7.84, D.W. = 1.95 
 
Where GC is government consumption expenditures and GDIN and YIN are Indian 
defence expenditures and GDP respectively.  
Equations (17), (22), and (23) were re-estimated as a system by the full 
information maximum likelihood method (FIML) using TSP 4.2B. This is to account 
for simultaneity and high covariance between the equations.  The empirical results 
are as follows: 
g = 6.38 + 2.56 IOCR – 1.11(GD/Y) + 0.08(F/Y) + 0.20(S/Y) … (24) 
 (1.24) (2.04) (–1.36) (0.60) (2.21) 
R2 = 0.30, D.W. Statistic = 2.17 
S/Y =  9.95 + 0.14g – 0.30INF – 0.32(F/Y) + 1.82(GD/Y) … (25) 
 (1.00) (1.52) (–1.91) (–1.21) (1.34) 
R2 = 0.50, D.W. Statistic = 1.67 
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(GD/Y) = 3.91 + 0.19(GC/Y) – 0.64(GDIN/YIN) + 0.69n … … (26) 
 (2.30) (2.84) (–1.24) (1.31) 
                 R2 = 0.58, D. W. Statistic = 1.96 
 
On comparing Equations (17) and (24) which explain GDP growth we find 
that by performing a systems estimation the explanatory power of the equation goes 
slightly up. Generally the parameter estimates and their statistical significance has 
not changed much except for the defence burden variable which becomes statistically 
insignificant. However, the point estimate of its effect on growth has gone up 
(become more negative).  Comparison of the single equation estimates with system 
estimates for the savings ratio [Equations (22) and (25) respectively] reveals that all 
parameters except for inflation become statistically insignificant.  The point estimate 
for the defence burden variable goes down tremendously.  Although the defence 
burden has a positive effect on the savings ratio, it is statistically insignificant.  
The point estimates, except for the constant term, in the defence burden 
equation decrease when we estimate it as part of a system [Equation (26)]. Only the 
government budget variable comes in as statistically significant. While the Indian 
defence burden stays inversely related to the Pakistan defence burden, it is no longer 
statistically significant.  
 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper represents a preliminary attempt at exploring the impacts of 
defence expenditures on economic growth and other major economic variables in the 
Pakistan economy.  We use a time series annual data set especially constructed for 
this purpose. The data set covers the period 1972–1995.  The results of Granger-
causality test show that there is bi-directional feedback between the defence burden 
and GDP growth.   
We test four different single equation models that are widely used in the 
defence literature. In these frameworks we generally find the defence burden to be 
negatively related to GDP growth, growth of non-defence output, investment ratio, 
and tax revenues as a ratio of GDP.  The agriculture, industry, and tertiary sector 
outputs, as ratios of GDP, are affected positively by the defence ratio.  However the 
statistical significance of nearly all these relationships is questionable. 
Finally, we specify a three-equation model which explains GDP growth, 
average propensity to save, and the defence ratio.  In single equation estimations of 
the savings ratio and the defence burden, we uncover some interesting relationships.  
The savings ratio is affected positively by the defence ratio, and negatively by the 
inflation rate. The Pakistani defence burden is impacted negatively by the Indian 
defence burden and positively by the government budget. When all three equations 
are estimated as a system to account for feedback and covariance between these 
equations, these effects are diminished and go down in statistical significance. 
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In light of our investigation for Pakistan it appears that the interconnection 
between defence and growth is not simply a gun and butter problem with a necessarily 
inverse trade-off between the two.  Future research efforts should be geared to 
understanding more clearly the determinants of defence expenditures with explicit 
recognition of the strategic environment that Pakistan finds itself.  This would include 
endogenising India’s strategic considerations.  Also the effect of the military complex on 
political stability/instability in the country and the latter’s  effect on economic growth 
would have to be uncovered.  All this implies the analysis of more complex 
interrelationship.  Hopefully, such an analysis will also be more intellectually satisfying. 
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